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Abstract
   Recent empirical research on product development in the world auto industry indicates 
that projects with less specialized task assignments and "stronger" (heavyweight) project 
managers have better performance. The best project organization thus appears to have char-
acteristics ofboth centralized and decentralized coordination. The shift to such organizational 
form has been observed worldwide inthe 1980s and is expected to continue in the 1990s. The 
purpose of the paper is to seek to understand this observation from the viewpoints ofinforma-
tion economics. It is argued that the heavyweight project manager system performs better not 
just because of its strong coordination capability but because of the centralized responsibility 
for concept creation and the centralized strong incentive system. It is shown that under this 
system, project participants are optimally induced to have broader task assignments: Strong 
product managers and the low levels of specialization appear in conjunction. These features 
result from the growing significance of "product integrity" more than functionality of a few 
dimensions ofthe new product.
  * Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the conference on "Japan in a Global 
Economy-A European Perspective" held at the Stockholm School of Economics, 5-6 Septem-
ber 1991, and at the Mitsubishi International Conference on "New Imperatives for Managing 
in Revolutionary Change," held in Ito City, Japan, 3-6 September, 1992. I would like to thank 
Hiroyuki Itami and John McMillan for helpful comments and the conference participants for 
helpful discussions. 
  t Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-01, Japan. Tel: +81-75-
753-3423, Fax: +81-75-751-1532, Bitnet: e52832@jpnkudpc
                          1. Introduction 
   How does an effective organization form for developing complicated new products look 
like? Recent empirical research in the world auto industry provides an interesting answer: 
project organizations with broad task assignments among engineers and powerful product 
managers (called "heavyweight" product managers) have better performance in product de-
velopment (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 1987; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Womack, Jones, and 
Roos, 1990). The purpose of the paper is to seek to understand this seemingly paradoxical 
observation. 
    In order to design a new car, numerous decisions on the target market of consumers, 
specifications, appearance, performance, and so on, must be made. Furthermore, various di-
mensions of the car must fit well together: decisions must be coordinated. Failing to attain 
the proper coordination among various attributes of the car will be very costly. One key role 
of a product manager is certainly to ensure coordination. The heavyweight product manager 
system in which a product manager is responsible for all aspects of the project and has strong 
influence over participating engineers will probably achieve more effective centralized coor-
dination among engineers. However, then why do engineers under the heavyweight product 
manager system are less specialized? Similarly, if engineers perform multiple tasks together so 
that they can share knowledge asily and coordinate their activities autonomously, the need 
for centralized coordination by the product manager should be reduced. 
   Given the empirical results, I will discuss two types of reasons why this combination of a 
small degree of specialization with a strong product managers i  optimal. The first scenario 
looks at the product manager's role as a strategic business decision maker. As Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991) argue, one of the most important roles of the heavyweight product man-
ager is to create and communicate a core concept of the new product that matches consumer 
expectations. He requires allocating his limited attention to information gathering about con-
sumer needs and to communication of the concept with engineers, besides to already complex 
tasks of coordination across detailed functional activities and components. It is usually the 
case that engineers are expected to have a priori information about how the details must be 
coordinated and implemented. Broad task assignments and job duplication further encour-
age interaction and communication among engineers, and enable them to attain an internally 
consistent combination of activities without relying much on the product manager. However, 
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there are in general many combination that are internally coherent and not all of them are 
globally optimal: Technological progress or changing customer expectations change the most 
effective combination discontinuously. Creating an explicit concept and communicating it with 
engineers ensure that the combination chosen by the engineers is globally optimal. Today the 
integrity of the car and its match to ambiguous and changing customer expectations appear to 
be more important than individual functional performances. The problem that lateral coor-
dination may reach a combination which is internally consistent but not the best one is more 
serious. The product manager should hence attend more to concept creation and infusion, 
and less to detailed engineering coordination per se. The result is that less specialized (for the 
purpose of lateral coordination among engineers) while more centralized (in terms of business 
decision making, i.e., concept creation) product development organizations perform better. 
   The second story focuses on the incentive dimension of product development. Another im-
portant role of the heavyweight product manager that is absent in other types of organizations 
is to provide project members with strong incentives to cooperate for success of, the project. 
Although I do not offer any answer to the question of how the product manager, without for-
mal authority, can influence engineers, I will argue that, provided that strong incentives can 
be provided, the heavyweight product manager will (rationally) induce participating engineers 
to perform awide range of tasks with job duplication with others. The key factors are team 
production and complementarities. Complementarities across tasks and engineers are inherent 
in complex product development such as designing a new car: As an engineer does more of an 
activity, his marginal returns to doing more of any other activity as well as the other engineers' 
marginal returns to the first activity increase. This feature not only creates the possibility of 
coordination failure discussed above, but also makes the performance measurement at each 
task difficult. Then the organization can reduce the costs of inducing engineers to work hard 
for the success of the project, by increasing the number of tasks performed by each individual 
engineer and creating joint responsibility sothat some tasks are performed jointly by several 
engineers. Without the heavyweight product manager, broadening task assignments would 
increase the incentive costs. 
   These two points are also important in understanding the internal organization f Japanese 
firms in general. It is often said that in the stylized Japanese firm more responsibilities are 
delegated to workers than in the Western counterpart, e.g., coordination tasks, responses to
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emergent events, and so on, and there is some systematic empirical evidence as well (see Aoki 
(1988) and Lincoln and McBride (1987) for a survey). However, one should also note that 
such decentralization works well only within some acceptable conditions that are set by a 
central unit. For example, it is the careful prior production scheduling by the central plan-
ning office and the factory engineering office that enables the horizontal coordination through 
"kanban" to perform fine tuning of production across horizontal shops effectively and flexibly 
(see Monden, 1983). 
   On the incentive side, Aoki (1988) summarizes my point in his First Duality Principle: 
In order for firms to be internally integrative and organizationally effective, either their coor-
dination or their incentive mode needs to be hierarchical, but not both. Japanese firms tend 
to be less hierarchical in coordination of operation decisions while they rely on centralized in-
centive systems. Product development organization mainly adopted by the Japanese makers 
is consistent with this pattern: engineering coordination is decentralized to less specialized 
functional structures with intensive lateral information flow, while incentives are centralized 
through the heavyweight product manager. A problem of many projects in the West may be 
that they are decentralized both in coordination. and incentives. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical evidence 
on product development in the world auto industry. Section 3 is devoted to the informal study 
of specialization in organizations. Then based on the discussion in Section 3, Sections 4 and 5 
develop two theories of the optimal organization structure mentioned above in detail. Section 6 
contains a summary and concluding remarks, with some thoughts on international differences.
                      2. Empirical Findings 
   Two large-scale r search projects have recently reported interesting findings on product 
development organization. The work by Clark and Fujimoto (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 
1987; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) surveyed almost all the U.S., Japanese, and European auto 
makers, and collected ata on a number of product development projects; each engaged in 
development of either an entirely new model or a major model change in which over half the 
parts were newly designed. The regional data collected by Clark and Fujimoto revealed that 
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even after adjusting differences in size and scope of projects, the average Japanese project 
attained better performance (significantly shorter lead time), using less engineering hours, 
than the average U.S. and European counterparts. They then conducted further analysis to 
find factors explaining this difference. 
    The larger scale research project by IMVP (International Motor Vehicle Project) at MIT 
pursued to understand a new production system called "lean system," mainly adopted by 
Japanese makers, in contrast to the traditional mass production system (Womack, Jones, and 
Roos, 1990). While this research project covered not only product development but also almost 
every aspect of business and transaction i the auto industry, the researchers, partly relying 
on the work by Clark and Fujimoto, also attempted tounderstand differences in performance 
of design methods employed by mass and lean producers. 
    The major finding on the relationship between product development organization and 
performance, due to Clark and Fujimoto, is that what hey call the heavyweight product man-
ager system attains uperior performance onspeed, productivity, and product quality. Clark 
and Fujimoto define four modes of development organization based on the differences in the 
degree of specialization a d the power of product managers. In the traditional functional 
structure, engineers are relatively specialized and no individual has overall responsibility for 
the total product. Instead, the heads of functional divisions are responsible for the perfor-
mance of their function. In the lightweight product manager system, work is still organized 
into functional divisions, and hence ngineers belong to their functional groups and may work 
on other projects at a time. Their degree of specialization is similar to that found in the 
functional structure. The difference is that a product manager is in charge of coordinating 
activities among participating engineers. However, product managers are "lightweight" in
several respects: Compared with functional managers, they have relatively low status within 
the firm; They have no direct access to working-level engineers on the project and hence only 
limited influence over them; The lightweight product manager is only in charge of coordination 
within engineering function and possibly of product planning, and has neither direct market 
contact nor concept responsibility. 
   In the heavyweight product manager system, the organization is again largely functional, 
and hence the product manager has no formal authority. However, the heavyweight product 
manager has strong direct and indirect influence across all functions and activities in the 
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project, works directly with engineers, and has a status in the firm at the same as or higher 
rank than the heads of the functional divisions. Furthermore, the product manager in this 
system has direct responsibility not only for engineering coordination but also for product 
planning and concept creation. Participating engineers work within their functional areas as 
in the lightweight product manager system, while they are now more strongly oriented toward 
the product, and their task assignments are broader than the first two systems. 
   The fourth and final mode called the project execution team structure, though no maker 
has adopted this structure, has a group of engineers who devote all their time to the project. 
They leave their functional departments and the product manager now has formal authority 
over them. The engineers will have broader esponsibilities n their functional tasks and as 
members of the team than any other system. 
   Clark and Fujimoto measure the degree of specialization bythe total number of engineers 
and technical support personnel who were involved with the project on more than a short-term 
basis, and find that the relationship between the degree of specialization a d performance is 
negative: projects with lower degrees of specialization are faster and more efficient. They 
also find that the heavyweight product manager system has the lower degree of specialization, 
though it is regarded as the one with the higher degree of integrity and coordination, than 
the functional structure and the lightweight product manager system. In particular, task 
assignments among engineers in Japanese projects tend to be broader both in breadth of 
activities (e.g., an engineer does both design and testing) and in range of components (e.g., 
an engineer does the entire door lock mechanism rather than only the door hatch).' 
   Clark and Fujimoto further argue that the worldwide trend of organizational change is 
from a purely functional structure with no product manager to a product manager system, 
and from lighter to heavier managers. Although many of the best performing projects were 
Japanese, the regional differences donot seem to be the whole story. Even within each region, 
the same relationship as those reported above can be observed. Although they have not 
controlled a size effect in comparison, "there is at least a hint in the data that the more effective 
projects are likely to be smaller than average, with broader assignments for participating 
  1 One might argue that the number of participants in the average Japanese project is smaller 
because Japanese auto makers rely more on their major suppliers for design and drawings for 
parts than the Western makers (Asanuma, 1988, 1989). Fujimoto (personal communication) 
told me that he and Clark adjusted this possible bias to obtain the result. 
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engineers." (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 1987, p. 756). 
   Womack et al. attribute the Japanese advantages mainly to the following four organiza-
tional factors: (i) leadership of the heavyweight product manager; (ii) the tightly knit team; 
(iii) highest efforts at the outset of product development; and (iv) the pursuit of multiple 
development activities imultaneously. By (ii) they imply that those involved in the project 
are much well motivated for the success ofthe project, compared with American organizations 
where a project is moved from department to department along with personnel changes at 
each step. In the U.S. project, the number of people involved is very small at first but grows 
toward the time of product launch in order to resolve problems that should have been cleared 
up in the beginning. The manager in the Japanese project resolves conflicts about objectives 
and roles at the outset. Once consensus is reached, subsequent progress i very rapid. In 
particular, various aspects of the project progress simultaneously, e.g., body design and die 
production, with an immense amount of information flows. This factor is also supported by 
a finding by Clark and Fujimoto: The Japanese projects howed ahigh degree of overlap of 
development activities in time, and intensive transfer of preliminary design information from 
upstream to downstream. The relation between the degree of overlapping and lead time was 
significantly negative in the Japanese data only; little relation was found in the rest of the 
sample. 
   Although little comparative r search exists outside the auto industry, the implications 
from these findings eem to apply to today's other manufacturing industries with complex 
products. Based on the detailed research of several industries, the report by the MIT Com-
mission on Industrial Productivity identifies emerging patterns of best industrial practice, 
which are largely consistent with the results shown above (Dertouzos et al. 1989). 
   It is not obvious to explain these findings from coordination purposes, particularly better 
performance of both more centralized (stronger product managers) and more decentralized 
(functionally less specialized) systems. In Sections 4 and 5, I will focus on two distinguished 
roles of the heavyweight product managers, concept creation and incentive supply, in order to 
explain these interesting observations. Before doing so, I will examine the effects of different 
specialization levels of engineers in a project informally in the next section, because little 
economic analysis on the extent of division of labor has been done. The analysis offers an 
important basis of my arguments to understand the optimal development organization form. 
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            3. Specialization and Job Design in a Project 
   According to Clark and Fujimoto, the degree of specialization in a project is smaller under 
one system than under another if the total number of engineers i  smaller under the former 
system. This implies two possibilities. First, on average, an engineer in the former system 
performs more tasks. For example, suppose that there are four divisible tasks in a project. If 
firm A uses four engineers each of which performs one of them without no duplication, and 
firm B uses two engineer one of which works on two of the tasks and the other is assigned to 
the other two tasks, then the degree of specialization is smaller in firm B than firm A. Note 
that in these firms, each task is performed by only one engineer: there is no joint responsibility. 
However, there is also a possibility of job duplication. Suppose that in firm C, two engineers 
jointly perform all the four tasks. Firm C has a lower level of specialization than Firm A, 
while the more important difference may be that in Firm C each task is performed jointly by 
two engineers. 
   These two features of lowering the level of specialization in a project have sometimes 
similar, sometimes different effects on the performance of the project. In the first subsection, 
I focus on technological issues uch as coordination and economies of specialization. There I
rule out incentive problems by assuming that all the participating engineers are only interested 
in the success of the project. The second subsection focuses on incentive issues-how the costs 
of providing engineers with strong incentives to cooperate for the success of the project vary 
with the degree of specialization. 
3.1 Coordination and specialization 
Coordination advantages: If an engineer performs more tasks, coordination is likely to be 
easier. For example, suppose that in the example given above, activities in the four tasks 
are interrelated and hence must be arranged properly. In firm A, specialized, independent 
activities at the four tasks may not be optimal for the project as a whole, and hence coordi-
nation among four engineers by some centralized unit will be necessary. In firm B, centralized 
coordination is required between two engineers, as long as each engineer there understands 
how his two tasks should relate with one another. In firm C, coordination among engineers i  
still needed. However, because they work jointly on all the tasks, they will be able, to some 
degree, to share knowledge and information and to adjust heir activities without a centralized 
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unit. Such lateral coordination is difficult in firm A because the engineers there are isolated 
and specialized. If lateral coordination has some advantages over centralized , hierarchical 
coordination, one can conclude that firm C has coordination advantages over firm A . For 
example, because engineers tend to have better information about their tasks , lateral coordi-
nation may have an advantage of utilizing such information, provided that communication is 
costly (see Bolton and Farrell (1990) for an economic analysis). Or in some situations, lateral 
coordination may be fast and flexible (see Aoki (1986; 1988, Chapter 2)). 
Loss in economies of specialization: The productivity of each engineer may be higher in firm 
A than in firms B or C, because in firm A, he can concentrate on one task: If each task 
requires intensive attention and highly distinctive expertise, higher levels of specialization will 
utilize the talents and efforts of engineers more effectively. Specialization may also result in 
learning by doing, and increase the engineers'. productivity. Note, however, that if two tasks 
are interrelated such that performing one task increases the returns from the other task (two 
tasks are complementary) and this effect dominates the economies of specialization, then these 
tasks should be performed by one engineer: firm B may be superior to firm A. 
Substituting centralized coordination: The discussion given above implies that the centralized 
coordination among specialized members and the decentralized coordination with a small de-
gree of specialization are substitutes: ceteris paribus, decreasing inputs from a centralized unit 
for coordination purposes increases the need for lateral coordination, and hence reduces the 
degree of specialization. Similarly, if the input by the product manager for coordinating the 
details of the plans increases, the degree of specialization will rise in order to pursue special-
ization economies more extensively.2 This reasoning being accepted, the empirical findings are 
puzzling. One needs to look at the roles of the heavyweight product manager in more detail. 
3.2 Incentive effects of job design 
   I now consider the effects of task assignments on the engineers' incentives to perform their 
tasks. Suppose for a while that the four tasks are technologically independent: Activities 
at one task have no effect on the other tasks. This assumption excludes the technological 
considerations given in the preceding subsection. 
 2 See Itoh (1988) for an attempt o formalize this relationshi
p between specialization a d 
coordination systems. 
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Incentives and measurement: I first assume that performance in each of the four tasks can 
be measured separately (possibly with noise). Then in firm A and firm B, the performance 
measure of each task provides information about the effort of the engineer who is assigned 
to that task. However, in firm C, all the performance measures reflect he efforts of the two 
engineers: Sole responsibility has an advantage in supplying more informative performance 
measures than joint responsibility. Next, suppose that the four tasks differ in terms of mea-
surability. Suppose further that performance at two of the tasks are substantially easier to 
measure than the others, while the former tasks are not as important as the latter in terms 
of its impact on the project outcome. Then if in firm B, each engineer is assigned to an easy-
to-measure task and a hard-to-measure task, a problem will arise: The engineer may allocate 
too much effort to the less significant but more visible task. Thus, firm B cannot provide 
strong incentives via the performance measure at the easier.-to-measure task. This problem 
does not occur in firm A. Of course, firm B can remedy the problem by assigning one engineer 
to two easy-to-measure tasks and the other to the hard-to-measure tasks (see Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991) for the formal analysis). 
   The second case to be analyzed is that there are two identical signals, one of which 
measures the joint performance at two of the tasks, the other measures the performance at
the other two tasks. Now the task assignment i  firm A has a measurability problem: Each 
performance measure reflects efforts from two engineers. They may reduce their efforts by 
attempting to free-ride on each other. In firm B this problem can be avoided by assigning 
one engineer to the first two tasks and the other to the remaining two. In firm C, all the four 
tasks are performed by two engineers, and hence the measurability problem continues to exist. 
However, it is still possible that the task assignment i  firm C, which is broader than that 
in firm B, can keep the effort incentives high, even without complementarities, by reducing 
monotonicity or boredom of performing a few tasks (see Itoh (1991; 1992a) for the formal 
derivation of this result). 
   Finally, consider the most realistic situation where task-specific performance measures 
are not at all available: The only measure is the total performance of the project. Assume 
also that firms can nevertheless impose the task assignments on engineers: For example, 
I assume that firm A can still make each agent work on just one task. Then the degree 
of specialization does not affect performance measurement, while the three task assignment 
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patterns will have different results in performance, depending on how tasks and engineers 
interrelate with each other. Obviously, the technological considerations in the previous ection 
are important. Many engineering tasks are likely to be mutually complementary: doing more 
of any one task increases the marginal profitability of each other activity. The existence of 
complementarities will favor a small degree of specialization because of more coordination 
advantages and less disadvantages from the loss of specialization economies. However, there 
are a few other considerations. 
Cooperation and incentives: Broader task assignments with job duplication as in firm C can 
not only facilitate lateral coordination but also reduce incentive costs. Because the engineers 
jointly work on the tasks, it is easy to monitor each other's activity mutually. Suppose that 
as a result of peer monitoring, the engineers jointly make decisions concerning how to perform 
the tasks together. Such cooperation may be beneficial to the firm, compared with the case 
in which the engineers behave independently, in the sense that the engineers can be induced 
to work appropriately while less responsibility needs to be imposed on each engineer (see Itoh 
(1992a; 1992b) for the formal analysis). 
Interpersonal complementarities and incentives: In product development organization, not 
only complement arities among tasks but also complementarities among engineers at each task 
may exist: Any one engineer's productivity at a task increases as the other engineers work more 
on that same task. This feature mitigates the measurement problem under joint responsibility, 
and provides job duplication with another advantage over highly specialized task assignments 
(Itoh, 1991). 
   Changing the level of specialization i  a product development project has several effects. 
The main conclusion is that in the environments facing the automobile industry today, broad-
ening task assignments and creating job duplication in the project have several advantages. 
The next two sections relate these results with the heavyweight product manager.
                4. Concept Creation and Coordination 
   One distinct aspect of the successful product development organization is that the prod-
uct manager has broader responsibilities, not only coordination within engineering but also 
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product planning and marketing (see the findings ummarized in Section 2). In particular, he 
is responsible for creating the concept of the new product and communicating it to designers 
and engineers in their languages. 
    The importance of product concept appears to be growing. Customers today demand 
not only a high level of functional performance such as fuel efficiency, noise, handling, etc. 
but also "product integrity" such as reliability, product image, total driving experience, tc., 
which must closely match ambiguous and rapidly changing consumer xpectations. 
    However, expertise and information necessary for concept creation are not easily available 
in engineering groups. To improve decision making in a project, a huge amount of information 
must be gathered and processed. As Simon (1976) eloquently stated, even though information 
sources abound, capacities to process information are scare resources
, and each member must 
allocate his limited attention/time tovarious information sources. Geanakoplos and Milgrom 
(1991) show formally that in such a circumstance, asymmetric information is unavoidable in 
an optimal organization: each member should have better information about some aspects of 
problem solving than any other member. In some cases, each member optimally limits their 
attention to information sources that affect his immediate operating decisions, even if the 
members share the goal of the project. Engineers thus specialize in gathering technological 
information only relevant to their local activities and are not likely to acquire important 
information about product concept satisfying consumer demand. The point is that engineers 
do not seem to have advantages in gathering information needed for creating product concept 
that fulfills customer expectations. 
   In the heavyweight product manager system, top management delegates the task of con-
cept creation to a product manager who optimally specializes in relevant information process-
ing. According to Clark and Fujimoto, the heavyweight product manager spends considerable 
time and resources for market information gathering, often not through the marketing unit 
but through his own staff or by direct contract with consumers (e.g., visit dealers). In the 
functional structure and the lightweight product manager system, top management may de-
velop product concepts based on information from the marketing division , or may delegate 
the decision to marketing managers. 
   What are the advantages of delegating concept development to a product manager? First , 
every firm has a range of models, and hence it is too costly for top management to allocate 
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its precious time to concept development of many products. Some degree of delegation will 
be inevitable. The major problem of delegating it to the market division is communication 
with engineers. It is not easy for marketing people to translate their concept decision into the 
engineers' languages. Note that most heavyweight product managers are engineers in their 
background. Furthermore, they can learn the languages of customers through more direct 
information gathering than mere use of data from the marketing division. 
   By realizing the role of the heavyweight product manager as a concept creator besides a 
coordinator, the optimality of a project organization with a small degree of specialization and 
a strong manager can be figured out. Although I do not have a specific model, it is possible 
to construct a model consistent with the story given here, which features limited manage-
rial attention (as in Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991)). Suppose that when product integrity 
becomes more important and customer expectations become more uncertain and volatile, re-
allocating more attention to the information sources relevant to concept creation leads to 
higher returns to the project. The product manager then rationally increases his attention 
to such data and attends less to information relevant to detailed engineering coordination. 
Then, the return to lateral coordination among engineers increases, and they optimally re-
duce their degree of specialization in order to facilitate such coordination, as I argued in the 
previous section. Note that many problems may have been resolved by the manager at the 
outset of the project as Womack et al. (1990) point out. However, there could arise later 
many unforseen problems in implementing the details, and the less specialized structure has 
advantages of solving the problems more quickly and flexibly. The result is that as product 
integrity becomes more important, more centralized (in terms of concept creation and its re-
lated information gathering) and more decentralized (interms of engineering coordination, 
and hence less specialized) product organization performs better. 
    This simple explanation depends on several assumptions. First of all, each party has 
only limited attention and hence must determine how to allocate it to various activities. This 
assumption is what Simon (1976) have emphasized. Second, the marginal returns to the 
product manager's input into concept creation increases as the understanding of the product 
integrity and its match with consumer expectations become more critical. To grasp this 
relation, it is important to realize that designing a new car is a problem with design attributes 
and innovative attributes ( ee Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chapter 4)). Diverse activities 
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by engineers are likely to exhibit mutual complementarities: doing more of any one activity 
increases the marginal profitability of each other activity in the engineering group. Then the 
product development project has design attributes: (i) the cost of failing to fit the details 
together is very high, and hence reaching an internally consistent combination of decisions is 
very crucial; (ii) it is not difficult for engineers topredict how the activities relate with each 
other. It is usually the case that there are many possible combinations of activities that are 
internally coherent, and each engineer will still be able to reach one of them by making decisions 
based on history, customs, or what others are doing. However, there is in general only one best 
combination that is not only consistent internally but also match customer expectations well. 
This information concerning the globally optimal combination is not available to the engineers, 
as was discussed above. Furthermore, environments surrounding the automobile industry 
are now very volatile: consumer expectations are changing and ambiguous. These features 
that lead to missing information for reaching the solution are called innovative attributes. 
In addition, because of complementarities among activities, a small change in each activity 
could shift the globally optimal combination discontinuously from one combination to another. 
This is why the importance of the product manager's role as a concept infuser increases as 
integration to consumer expectations becomes more critical. 
    Note that in this story, the product manager's effort into engineering coordination itself is 
smaller under the heavyweight system than under the lightweight system: The distinguished 
role of the heavyweight product manager is not to coordinate engineers' activities directly 
but to ensure that autonomous engineering coordination reaches the right combination of 
activities in the set of internally coherent combinations. The lightweight product manager 
does not play this role, and hence more attention is allocated to internal coordination per 
se. The result is more specialization by engineers under the lightweight product manager 
system. How about the functional structure? Coordination under that system is through 
rules and procedures, detailed specifications, shared traditions among engineers, occasional 
direct contacts, and meetings (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Adaptation of product integrity 
to changing external environments appears to be nil. Therefore, flexible coordination across 
functional areas is not significant, and hence the highest degree of specialization emerges. 
   In this section, I have taken the so-called team theoretic approach where all the members 
of the organization are assumed to share its common goal. The main theme was the choice of 
                             13
organizational form in order to improve organizational decision making, from the perspective 
of limited rationality (imperfect ommunication and limited attention). Incentive issues were 
ignored in order to simplify the analysis. They are discussed in detail in the subsequent section.
          5. Incentives in Product Development Organization 
   Womack et al. (1990) distinguish the best projects with heavyweight managers from 
other projects, in terms of the strength of control over the participants by the managers: In
the former, "[the project members] retain ties to their functional department... but for the life 
of the program they are clearly under the control of the shusa [a typical Japanese word for 
product managers]. How they perform in the team, as judged by the shusa, will control their 
next assignment, which will probably be another development eam." " In contrast, in most 
Western companies a development project consists of individuals, including the team leader, 
who are on short-term loan from a functional department. ... Key evaluations will come from 
the head of the employee's functional division..." (p. 114). The role of the heavyweight product 
manager appears to be not only gathering information to create concept and to coordinate, 
but also providing the members with strong incentives to cooperate for the success of the 
project. 
   Note that even the heavyweight product manager has no formal authority over partici-
pants. The formal boss of an engineer isthe head of the functional department to which he 
belongs. Formal merit assessments are also conducted on functional basis. It is thus not clear 
how heavyweight product managers can motivate project participants. This paper does not 
offer any answer to this question. However, several case studies indicate that heavyweight 
product managers can in fact have participating engineers work for the projects. The citation 
from Womack et al. (1990) given above contains an example: Performance of the participating 
engineers in the project eam affects their career. Or good product mangers can direct the 
project oward his goal simply by persuading and convincing the participants and functional 
managers. I hence assume that top management can design product development organization 
such that the product manager has strong influence over members. I also assume, as in the 
previous ection, that top management itself cannot perform the role of the motivator, due to 
limited attention. 
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   Without a centralized incentive system for a project, incentives are largely provided 
through functional divisions. The degree of specialization in the project will then increase, 
because project engineers have little incentive to work with those from other divisions, and 
functional managers would like to limit the time they spend for the project so as to leave much 
time for functionally oriented tasks. The other direction is similar. If each engineer's activities 
are restricted to his narrow specialty area in a project, strong, product-oriented incentives will 
be unnecessary; incentives through functional division will suffice. 
   Although such a decentralized approach to incentives might be good in motivating each 
engineer to pursue a high level of functionality of cars within his specialty field, the priority of 
well-matched product integrity over specialized functionality in the today's auto industry will 
diminish the returns from such decentralized incentives drastically. Centralized incentives are 
crucial.
5.1 Centralized incentives and broad task assignments 
   Once the product manager obtains control over the members, the discussion i Section 3
offers everal reasons why he may seek to induce the project engineers to engage in multiple 
activities possibly with job duplication; for example, design and testing of a door lock system 
are performed by a group of engineers rather than each engineer specializes in a narrow subtask 
of a small part of the system and hence more engineers in total perform the same set of tasks. 
The major factors are complementarities both across tasks and across engineers: an engineer's 
marginal productivity at one task increases as he does more at any other task or as the 
other engineers work more on the same task. Under this condition, a relatively low level 
of specialization saves incentive costs, and its relative benefits tend to dominate the costs, 
compared to highly specialized task assignments (see Section 3). Furthermore, the growing 
importance of product integrity reinforces the advantages ofbroad task assignments. 
   A perspective completely different from the discussion given above and in Section 3 pro-
vides another explanation of the relationship between the heavyweight product manager and a 
small degree of specialization. Note that the product manager does not have formal authority, 
and hence must spend considerable amount of time and energy to make engineers work for the 
project. Then if he finds engineers who are eager to exert efforts for the project, assigning them 
with broad responsibilities, rather than keeping them perform narrow tasks and attempting 
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to find other engineers, will save time and energy of the product manager, and thus it is more 
efficient for the project as well. 
   The upshot is that the existence of the product manager as a strong motivator induces 
low levels of specialization i  engineers. Without the centralized motivation mechanism, broad 
task assignments are not likely to emerge. 
5.2 The product manager's incentives 
   I next turn to the product manager's incentives. The product manager appears to be 
a very demanding position. The job may bring extraordinary satisfaction, in particular, for 
those who love to make cars, while it is a position which requires personal sacrifices. What 
makes the product manager work so hard? I argue that the heavyweight product manager 
system itself provides the product manager with stronger incentives to invest in the project 
than the lightweight product manager system. 
   To this end, I interpret the heavyweight product manager system as the one in which top 
management delegates the control rights of the project as a whole to one product manager. In 
the lightweight product manager system, most of the control rights are left to top management 
and/or functional managers. Inthe functional structure, the control rights are dispersed among 
functional managers. Which distribution pattern of the control rights lead to more efficient 
decisions? 
   This modelling has been adopted by several economists in the context of integration versus 
non-integration. They emphasize the concept of incomplete contracts ( ee Williamson, 1985; 
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). If parties can write comprehensive 
contracts which specify each side's responsibilities n all future contingencies, the organization 
structure, e.g., whether the project manager isheavyweight or lightweight, does not matter. 
If contracts are incomplete, responses to some future contingencies will be left unspecified 
because they are unforseen or it is too costly to prespecify what to do. Then if such an ex 
ante unforseen event actually occurs, the parties must negotiate. Bargaining is often costly, 
and hence the parties may want to specify how to resolve bargaining, e.g., who make decisions 
under unforseen contingencies. Specifying the allocation of residual control rights (which 
cannot be contracted explicitly) is one such example: Those who own the control rights can 
make decisions upon unforseen events. However, different allocation patterns of control rights 
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lead to different ex post returns, and hence can affect the parties' ex ante incentives, in 
particular, to invest in relation specific assets. 
    Human assets appear to be the most important relation specific assets in product devel-
opment. Managers hould work hard to engage in understanding of new product concepts and 
problem solving. If all the control rights of the project are allocated to a product manager, as 
in the heavyweight product manager system, then the returns from investment will be fully 
appropriated by him, and hence his incentives to invest are very high. This explains why the 
product manager's investment will be higher under the heavyweight product manager system 
than under the lightweight system. 
   On the other hand, the heavyweight product manager system will attenuate the incentives 
of functional managers to work for the project, compared with the functional structure in which 
some of the control rights are allocated to the heads of functional departments. However, I can 
still argue that the system which realizes concentration of the control rights to the product 
manager will be superior from this viewpoint. The heavyweight product manager system has 
an advantage of providing strong incentives for the product manager. And because of the 
importance of product integrity, the product manager's incentives to invest in the project are 
crucial to the success of the project. Furthermore, the diluted incentives of functional managers 
under the heavyweight system may not be really a problem since the heavyweight product 
manager can directly contact with the engineers in each functional unit who participate in the 
project, and obtain control over the engineers' investment decisions by some sort of indirect 
incentive mechanisms.
5.3 Heavier product managers? 
   Although the heavyweight product manager has strong control over the behavior of par-
ticipating engineers, the organization is still functional, and the engineers often work for other 
projects within their functional areas at a time. How can we understand this phenomenon? 
One obvious reason comes from technological considerations. If capable engineers are scarce re-
sources, the firm will hesitate to disperse valuable engineers to different projects on a full-time 
basis. Such a project assignment will lose a lot of benefits from complementarities. 
   The incentive viewpoints offer another explanation. Engineers who are assigned with 
several projects are evaluated by different managers. Because projects are inherently team 
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production, subjective evaluation by a manager is an important information source for the 
engineers' effort and ability. However, accompanying use of subjective information is two kinds 
of costs; influence costs, since the engineers will rationally spend unproductive resources to 
attempt to influence a manager's decisions to their favor, e.g., better task assignment, higher 
wages, higher status, and so on (see Milgrom (1988). and Milgrom and Roberts (1988) for 
formal analyses of influence activities); and costs from collusion and hidden gaming, since 
a manager may find it privately beneficial to treat some of his subordinates favorably or to 
demand some favor from each of them by threatening to favor others . Such behavior is costly 
to the organization as a whole (see Tirole (1986) and Laffont (1990) for the formal models). 
    It is argued that these costs restrict he use of subjective monitoring and hierarchical 
organizations inevitably acquire rule-oriented, bureaucratic features. However, the multi-
pro ject system can mitigate the problems. Influence activities will lose their effectiveness 
when there are several targets for such activities ince influencing just one manager now has 
less returns and influencing several managers i  costly. Collusion can be less costly because 
distorted monitoring information from a manager who colludes with an engineer can be checked 
by information supplied by other managers, and a larger coalition which involves everal 
managers i  much harder to sustain. 
   Considering careers of engineers and product managers yet offers other possible xpla-
nations. The firm wants to learn the engineers' abilities to improve task assignments and 
future promotion decisions. Suppose that an engineer performs everal projects imultane-
ously. Some of them are research activities in the functional departments, others are product 
development projects of different kinds of cars. He may also perform different tasks in dif-
ferent projects. His performance in each project will then supply valuable information about 
various aspects of his potential ability. If assigning him with more than one project at a time 
is better in the learning perspectives, then the firm will not select the project execution team 
structure.' In addition, performing multiple projects with great variety will offer important 
training opportunities to the engineers who may be promoted to the product managers. 
 3 However
, this conclusion istentative. Recently Meyer (1991) analyzes a learning model 
of project assignments with team production. In her model, the multi-project engineer system 
is worse in terms of learning the engineer's ability, while it is better in terms of learning the 
product manager's ability. 
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6. Concluding Remarks
    Development of sophisticated new products such as autos requires large-scale coordination 
among a number of functions and components. It is obvious to expect that an effective project 
organization has a central unit such as a product manager who coordinates development 
activities across functional units. The best performing organization has more than that. The 
product manager there is "heavyweight" in that he has broader responsibilities, in particular, 
he is responsible for concept creation and its communication; he has direct access to the project 
members ineach functional unit; and he has strong control over their decisions through some 
indirect incentive mechanisms. 
   Given the growing importance ofproduct integrity relative to functionality in a few di-
mensions, centralization f concept creation and its direct communication with engineers are 
more effective. Centralization ofthe control rights over the members' human decisions pro-
vides stronger incentives towork for the success of the project, for both the members and the 
manager himself. And given such a more centralized structure, the members are induced to be 
less specialized in their task assignments: he product manager can then delegate coordination 
tasks to them who engage in productive interaction more effectively but with less incentive 
costs. 
    The paper has exclusively focused on product development organization ofone project. 
It is however typical that in the firm several projects are in progress imultaneously. The 
analysis of multi-project organizations is an important future research topic. For example, 
the discussion i Section 5.3 suggests hat one examine the possibility of an engineer ngaging 
in multiple projects more carefully to understand the optimality of the heavyweight product 
manager system. 
   The paper closes with a final but important remark. The high performance of such a 
product development organization appears to be region-free. However, it is also true that most 
of them are Japanese. Can the "Japanese-style" system be easily adopted by Western projects 
as well? Or should they attempt to do so? Those who have studied product development i  
the auto industry, as well as the MIT Commission  Industrial Productivity, think that they 
should. However, it is also thought that it may not be easy to adopt he product development 
system alone: it is a part of a whole system and there could not exist one aspect without all 
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the other (Aoki, 1992). I have the same opinion and point out a few aspects of the Western 
economy that might be against he introduction of the best product development organization 
analyzed in this paper. 
   First, it is said that, particularly in the U.S., an engineer's career is narrower and the 
success mainly depends on moving up through his functional specialty.' Under this career 
pattern, decision making by engineers participating in a project will be strongly biased to-
ward the interest of their functional divisions because they will have much longer relationship 
with their functional managers than the product manager. Furthermore, functional managers 
themselves may not have interests in cooperating product development projects under such a 
specialized career pattern. 
   This implies that the need for strong product managers is higher in the U.S. than in 
Japan. However, simply introducing the same heavyweight product manager system as that 
of Japanese auto makers may not work, because the product manager there has no formal 
authority to direct participating engineers. More explicit matrix organization or even the 
project execution team structure may be inevitable. 
   Second, more competitive labor markets in the West than in Japan may be relevant. The 
analysis of Prendergast (1991) suggests hat when the labor market is competitive, senior 
managers may be reluctant to delegate much responsibility to a product manager because 
exerting more authority may improves their career prospects: For example, by carrying out 
many tasks, a senior manager may accumulate skills or discover his capability.' Similarly, 
the competitive labor market may bias engineers investment toward specialization, because 
specialization into narrow tasks is likely to increase their visibility from the labor market. 
   Because of these additional elements, the optimal organizational form may not be identical 
between the West and Japan. The data in Clark and Fujimoto (1991) seem to show that the 
trend is in the same direction across regions. Although how far this change goes may be 
different among the U.S., Europe, and Japan, their data suggest hat the analysis in the 
current paper be not far from pertinent. 
  ' See for example Sakakibara and Westney (1985) who compare ngineers' career in the 
computer industry in the US and Japan and obtain some supporting evidence. 
  5 Womack et al. (1990) report: "It's common in Detroit, Wolfsburg, and Paris for top 
management to override the team leader about the specifications and feel of the product-
often repeatedly during the course of development." (p.113). 
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